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BURMA AND SUPERPOWER RIVALRIES
IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC
Andrew Selth
The Western democracies have declared that their strong stances against thecurrent military regime in Burma* reflect principled stands against the 1988
massacres of pro-democracy demonstrators, the failure of the regime to recog-
nize the results of the 1990 general elections (which resulted in a landslide
victory for the main opposition parties), and the regime’s continuing human
rights abuses. Yet it can be argued that such a strong and sustained position
would have been less likely had the Cold War not ended and Burma’s impor-
tance in the global competition between the superpowers not significantly
waned. Lacking any pressing strategic or military reason to cultivate Burma, and
with few direct political or economic interests at stake, countries like the United
States and the United Kingdom can afford to isolate the Rangoon regime and im-
pose upon it pariah status. If this was indeed the calculation made in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, it is possible that the changes that have occurred in the strategic
environment since then may prompt a reconsideration of these policies.
Burma lies where South, Southeast, and East Asia meet; there the dominant
cultures of these three subregions compete for influence. It lies also across the
“fault lines” between three major civilisations—Hindu, Buddhist, and Confu-
cian.1 At critical times in the past, Burma has been a cockpit for rivalry between
superpowers. Today, in the fluid strategic environment of the early twenty-first
century, its important position is once again attracting attention from analysts,
officials, and military planners.2 Already, Burma’s close relationship with China
and the development of the Burmese armed forces have reminded South and
* The U.S. Department of State officially refers to the nation as the Union of Burma. The formal
name used by the Rangoon regime is Pyidaungzu Myanma Naingngandaw—Union of (variously)
Myanma or Myanmar.
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Southeast Asian countries, at least, of Burma’s geostrategic importance and
prompted a markedly different approach from that of the West.
INTERNATIONAL RIVALRIES BEFORE 1988
For centuries, the part of Southeast Asia that eventually became modern Burma
was largely isolated from, and ignorant of, the wider world. Burma was visited by
travelers and traders from a very early date, and by Europeans from the four-
teenth century, but it was of truly strategic interest only to its immediate neigh-
bors, with whom it fought a number of wars. India, China, and Thailand have all
invaded, and been invaded by, Burma at various times.3
As the major European empires expanded, however, and geopolitics began to
be practiced on a global scale, the world’s most powerful countries came to rec-
ognize that Burma occupied a geostrategic position of some importance. In
1824–26 Britain annexed the coastal districts of Arakan and Tenasserim; one of
its prime motives was to safeguard eastern India and close the gap between Ben-
gal and the Straits Settlements of Penang, Malacca, and Singapore.4 Sixty years
later, both the United Kingdom and France were competing for influence in the
Burmese court at Mandalay. Indeed, by attempting to balance the rivalry be-
tween these two colonial powers the last king of Burma, Thibaw (reigned
1878–85), probably helped precipitate his own downfall.5 The British authori-
ties in Delhi subsequently saw Burma as a bulwark against French westward ex-
pansion from Indochina. Burma also represented a possible overland trade
route to China.
In 1937, after Japan’s invasion of China, Japan’s opponents quickly realized
that Burma offered Chiang Kai-shek’s embattled Nationalist (or Kuomintang)
government a lifeline to Europe. Even before the Burma Road was officially
opened in January 1939, vital military supplies were flowing north to Chung-
king through the port of Rangoon.6 During the Second World War, Burma was a
major theatre of operations. Both Allied and Japanese strategists appreciated
that it not only provided China with access to the Indian Ocean and dominated
the Bay of Bengal but lay between Japan’s conquests in Southeast Asia and the
Allied bastion of British India. The campaign for Burma, which lasted from De-
cember 1941 until August 1945, was the longest and one of the most difficult of
the entire conflict.7
After the war, Burma continued to figure in the security calculations of key
Western policy makers. The Ministry of Defence in London, for example, anx-
ious to retain rights to use Burmese ports and airfields, persuaded the govern-
ment of Prime Minister Clement Attlee to include such access in its 1947
independence agreement with the Burmese. In the face of rising nationalist
sentiment in the Asia-Pacific region and the danger of communist insurgencies
4 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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in such colonies as Malaya, Mingaladon airfield outside Rangoon became an
important factor in British defence planning. It was considered necessary “in
connection with His Majesty’s Government’s air reinforcement route to the Far
East, and, in the event of an emergency arising, for the rapid movement of air
and land forces, to and through Burma.”8 Burma was strategically important to
Britain also as one of the main sources of rice for its Asian dependencies, where
food shortages were fuelling anticolonial sentiment. Because Burma was inside
the sterling currency area, Britain could purchase rice there for places like
Malaya without using its precious reserves of U.S. dollars.
After Burma was granted independence in 1948, its geostrategic position at-
tracted even wider attention. Close to China, India, and Vietnam, it was seen as
being “on the periphery of the free world.”9 During the 1950s, when Rangoon
was threatened by a number of insurgencies, including one led by the powerful
Communist Party of Burma, British Commonwealth countries made consider-
able efforts to shore up the fledgling governments (1948–58 and 1960–62) of
Prime Minister U Nu.10 To the members of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisa-
tion, Burma was a “domino” of almost as much strategic importance as Viet-
nam. The United States, for example, firmly believed that “should Burma come
under communist domination, a communist military advance through Thai-
land might make Indochina, including Tonkin, militarily indefensible.”11 To the
United Kingdom, the loss of Burma to the Chinese-sponsored Burmese com-
munists would threaten the security of Malaya (then including Singapore) and
the strategically important Straits of Malacca.12 Some Western analysts (who
clearly had not experienced the harsh terrain) were concerned about “a rela-
tively easy invasion route from Yunnan Province across northern Burma to In-
dia’s Assam province.”13 It has been claimed that India had a tacit understanding
with Burma over the joint defence of the Assam–northern Burma area in the
event of a Chinese invasion.14
Burma may not have been the most important Southeast Asian country
facing communist insurgency at the time, but all these concerns underscored
Burma’s strategic role in the ideological struggle then being conducted in the
Asia-Pacific region.
The United States and its allies were convinced that China was actively sup-
porting communist “subversion” throughout Southeast Asia and that this effort
was being coordinated, or at least encouraged, by the Soviet Union.15 Burma
could not be persuaded to join any military alliances, but the West identified it as
an ideal place for “listening posts” from which to observe developments inside
China. At the height of the Korean War, the United States even drew up plans to
use Burma as a springboard from which to launch the southern half of a “double
envelopment operation” against China.16 From 1951 until the mid-1950s, the
S E L T H 4 5
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Central Intelligence Agency provided covert military support to Kuomintang
troops who had fled China after the communist victory in 1949 and established
bases in Burma. With additional troops flown in from Taiwan, and supplements
of local insurgents, these forces eventually exceeded twelve thousand men. They
staged seven unsuccessful “invasions” of China before Burmese pressure in the
United Nations forced the United States to end its assistance to the Nationalists
and transfer some six thousand Kuomintang troops to Taiwan.17 Only when Ran-
goon sought Beijing’s help in 1961 and twenty thousand People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) soldiers conducted a joint operation with Burmese forces in north-
eastern Burma were the last remnants of the Kuomintang finally driven into
Thailand.18
The secret support of the United States for the Kuomintang helped to con-
firm the reservations of Burma’s leaders about involvement with foreign powers.
They felt strongly that Burma could and should manage its own affairs. Prime
Minister Nu was acutely conscious of the need to maintain good relations with
Burma’s powerful neighbor China, but otherwise he strove for strict neutrality
in international affairs.19 Burma was desperately in need of external assistance
to recover from the war, but Nu preferred aid from “independent” countries
like Israel and Yugoslavia; he was a major force behind the creation of the
Non-Aligned Movement in 1961.
After General Ne Win’s coup in 1962, Burma retreated even farther from the
mainstream of global affairs. Fearful of almost all outside influences, the new
military regime adopted and strengthened the former government’s neutral for-
eign policy, shunning most international contacts. In 1979 Burma even with-
drew from the Non-Aligned Movement, on the grounds (notwithstanding its
own socialist system) that the movement had become unduly influenced by the
Eastern bloc.20 In any case, the doctrinaire regime introduced by Ne Win’s
Burma Socialist Program Party permitted little external participation in the
country’s economy. It still welcomed foreign aid, particularly after the failure of
its own policies, but only on a scrupulously evenhanded basis. It was most ame-
nable to assistance provided by multilateral bodies like the United Nations and
through arrangements like the Colombo Plan.*
After the military coup and Burma’s withdrawal into xenophobia and isola-
tionism, its geostrategic standing greatly diminished. The country rarely figured
in published studies of regional security. Yet to a certain extent it was still seen as a
prize in the global competition between the major power blocs. The United States,
the Soviet Union, and the People’s Republic of China all maintained large missions
4 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
* Formed in 1950 at Colombo, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), by India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Australia, New
Zealand, and Great Britain to discuss and arrange financial and other assistance for development in
South and Southeast Asia.
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in Rangoon, facilities that served as bases for active diplomatic and intelligence
campaigns.21 Divided countries—the two Koreas, East and West Germany, and
North and South Vietnam—also competed for Burma’s diplomatic support in
forums like the UN General Assembly. Burma’s success in balancing all these
pressures can perhaps be gauged by the fact that at the height of the Cold War a
Burmese, U Thant, was twice unanimously elected secretary-general of the United
Nations.22
International interest in Burma’s geostrategic position, however, declined
even further after the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War in
1990. Indeed, as noted, had it not done so, it is unlikely that the United States
(and its friends and allies) would have felt able to adopt such strong policies
against the new military government in Rangoon. Ironically, it was the imposi-
tion of economic sanctions and arms embargoes by Western countries that en-
couraged the Rangoon regime to develop a much closer relationship with
Beijing, something that has in turn prompted other Asia-Pacific countries to re-
assess their relations with Burma.
THE MODERN STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
The creation of the State Law and Order Restoration Council in 1988 and its
subsequent introduction of a range of new policies broadly coincided with dra-
matic shifts in the global strategic environment. The end of communism in Russia
and Eastern Europe led to the emergence of the United States as the world’s sole
superpower. Accordingly, the agenda of the United Nations became much more
aligned to U.S. interests and values, and more interventionist in nature. This in
turn prompted a backlash by a diverse group of countries united by a desire to
deny the United States a paramount position in world affairs. Also, with the
close of the Cold War came the end of the relative stability and predictability of
the old power balance. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the
means to deliver them greatly complicated management of the strategic envi-
ronment. Finally, a number of new states and substate actors appeared, and new
tensions arose.
As a result of all these developments there now exists much greater fluidity,
and thus greater uncertainty, in international relations. In particular, the last
twenty years have seen the rise of China, which is now considered a serious chal-
lenger to the preeminence of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region.
Perhaps more than any other factor, perceptions of China now generally
shape the ways in which regional states are responding to changes in the strate-
gic environment. These perceptions may be based on a selective reading of his-
tory and on enduring myths about China’s worldview, but in international
relations perceptions become realities.23 Governments make national policy on
S E L T H 4 7
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S E L T H 4 9
BURMA’S GEOSTRATEGIC POSITION
Burma, covering 253,950 square miles, is the largest independent state in main-
land Southeast Asia.1 Its 3,640-mile land boundary touches five different coun-
tries, including two strategic giants. To the west it shares a nine-hundred-mile
border with India, a nuclear power that dominates the South Asian subconti-
nent and Bay of Bengal. To the northeast Burma shares a 1,350-mile border with
China, now within reach of the great-power status that it has long felt is its due.
In the east Burma’s frontier runs southwest and south for 1,100 miles alongside
Thailand, still an influential player in the region despite a number of setbacks in
recent years. At its easternmost point Burma shares a short border with Laos
(145 miles), and at its westernmost point another with Bangladesh (120 miles).
Though these five borders are in mostly rugged and heavily forested terrain,
they have always been porous to local ethnic communities, traders, drug smug-
glers, insurgents, and invading armies.
Burma’s coastline is 1,200 miles long, not counting the 852 islands that lie
within its waters (most in the Mergui Archipelago). Burma faces the Bay of Ben-
gal to the west and the Andaman Sea to the south. In 1977 the Burmese govern-
ment in Rangoon declared a territorial sea of twelve nautical miles and a
contiguous zone of twenty-four nautical miles. Since that time, Burma has also
laid claim to a continental shelf and exclusive economic zone of two hundred
nautical miles, thus extending its maritime interests over a total area of about
57,400 square miles.2 While Burma’s security concerns have traditionally been
land based, this large expanse of open ocean and coastal waters has long been
exploited by local fishermen, traders, smugglers, poachers, pirates, and the na-
vies of other countries.3 Burma does not dominate any major sea lines of com-
munication, but it is close to some Indian Ocean shipping lanes, and its airspace
is crossed by a number of important east-west commercial air routes.
A major dispute over the land boundary with China was satisfactorily re-
solved in 1960, and the border with Bangladesh was agreed upon in 1999, but
differences over territorial claims still arise with Burma’s neighbors.4 These dis-
putes tend to occur (with Thailand in particular) as a result of poorly demarcated
boundaries and shifting river courses. Maritime disputes are also common.
Burma has laid claim to its waters in a number of ways that seem to violate the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.5 An agreement was reached
with India over some of Burma’s claims in 1986, and in 1993 a trilateral agree-
ment was negotiated between Burma, India, and Thailand over the junction be-
tween the three countries’ exclusive economic zones in the Andaman Sea.6
1. These and the following statistics are drawn from Central Intelligence Agency, World
Factbook 2000 (Washington, D.C.), available on the World Wide Web: www.cia.gov/
cia/publications/factbook/geos/bm.html.
2. U.S. State Dept., Limits in the Seas, No. 36, National Claims to Maritime Jurisdictions
(Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
Affairs, 1995), p. 20. See also George Kent and M. J. Valencia, eds., Marine Policy in
Southeast Asia (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1985), p. 44.
3. See Andrew Selth, “The Burma Navy under the SLORC,” Journal of Contemporary
Asia, vol. 29, no. 2, 1999, p. 234.
4. See History of Chinese Communist Strategy re Sino-Burmese Border Question: Re-
search Backgrounder (Hong Kong: n.p., 1960); and Ralph Pettman, China in Burma’s
Foreign Policy, Contemporary China Papers 7 (Canberra: Australian National Univ.
Press, 1973), pp. 11, 23.
5. Kent and Valencia, Marine Policy in Southeast Asia, pp. 242–3. See also J. R. Morgan
and M. J. Valencia, eds., Atlas for Marine Policy in Southeast Asian Seas (Berkeley:
Univ. of California Press, 1983), p. 49.
6. Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, “Trends in the Delimitation of India’s Maritime Boundaries,”
Strategic Analysis, January 1999, pp. 1513–6.
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However, Burma has yet to settle a number of other maritime disputes, af-
fecting fishing rights, with Thailand and Bangladesh.1 Burma has also at-
tracted criticism from the United States for some of its bolder claims,
including insistence that foreign warships obtain permission from Rangoon
prior to entering its territorial sea and contiguous zone.2
Surrounded by rugged mountains to the west, north, and east, and wide
seas in the south, Burma is to a large extent geographically self-contained.
Communications with the rest of the world are poor. Indeed, before 1938
there were no road or rail routes to any neighboring countries. The Second
World War saw the construction of the Burma Road between Chungking and
Lashio, the Ledo Road from Mogaung to Ledo in northeastern Assam, and a
railway (built by Japan) from Ban Pong in Thailand through Three Pagodas
Pass to Thanbyuzayat. However, as a historian has noted, “all of these were of
strategic rather than commercial importance,” and none survived as a trunk
route after the war.3 Overland access to Burma is still very restricted, but projects
are under way to restore parts of the old Burma and Ledo Roads and to up-
grade land communications with India and Thailand.4 There are still no inter-
national rail links, but the old Japanese line from Thailand may eventually be
rebuilt as part of a proposed trans-Asia railway.5
As a result of all these factors, much of the legitimate foreign trade over
the last few centuries has been seaborne. This is not to discount the massive
scale of smuggling across Burma’s land borders since 1962, a problem that
has been but little reduced by a 1989 agreement legalising trade with China.6
Within Burma most rivers run north to south, as do the main transport
corridors. East-west travel is difficult. Burma boasts not quite eight thousand
miles of inland waterways, two thousand miles of which are navigable by
large commercial vessels. The Irrawaddy River, for example, carries shipping
from the sea to Bhamo, more than six hundred miles inland and only thirty
miles from the Chinese border. The Sittang, lower Chindwin, and lower
Salween Rivers are also used extensively by launches and other river craft, as is
the maze of tributaries and creeks in the Irrawaddy Delta. Indeed, “the role of
river navigation in traditional Burmese life can scarcely be exaggerated”;
these waterways remain a fundamental component in the country’s transport
network.7 Burma also has 17,500 miles of roads, but many follow the rivers
and railway corridors; only 2,100 miles of roads are paved. Since indepen-
dence, Burma has placed increasing reliance on air transport, but the national
fleet has always been small. Of the country’s eighty airfields, only three have
paved runways over 7,800 feet; most runways are unpaved.8
1. See, for example, “Junta Jails More than 300 Bangladesh Fishermen,” Reuters, 7
December 1999; and “Fishing Ban Preserved to Replenish Stocks,” Bangkok Post,
23 December 2000.
2. U.S. State Dept., Limits in the Seas, p. 20.
3. C. A. Fisher, South-East Asia: A Social, Economic and Political Geography (London:
Methuen, 1964), p. 464.
4. Interviews by author, Rangoon, April 1995. See also Bertil Lintner, “Burma Road,”
Far Eastern Economic Review [hereafter FEER], 6 November 1997, pp. 16–7.
5. Bruce Gilley, “All Aboard,” FEER, 14 December 2000, p. 29; and “New Border
Trade Post Opened on Sino-Burma Border,” Burma News Update, June 2000, p. 5.
6. It has been estimated that before 1988 almost half of Burma’s actual trade was
“unofficial”—that is, conducted on the black market (interview, Rangoon, April
1995). Trade with China now exceeds four hundred million dollars per annum
(Xinhua wire service, 19 October 1999).
7. Fisher, South-East Asia, pp. 442–3.
8. CIA, World Factbook 2000.
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Burma’s rulers have long been fearful of the massive populations of their
larger neighbors. Burma’s birthrate has been rising, but its population of
fifty million is dwarfed by those of China and India, the world’s two most
populous countries, with 1.262 billion and 1.014 billion people, respec-
tively.1 At an average of 190 people per square mile, Burma’s population
density is still lower than those of most major Southeast Asian countries.2
Greatly complicating the demographic question for Burma is the fact that its
population is not homogeneous. At present, about 68 percent are ethnic
Burmans, who have traditionally dominated the central lowlands. The re-
mainder comprises numerous ethnic groups and subgroups, largely concen-
trated in separate zones around the country’s highland periphery. The most
important of these groups are the Shan (who constitute 9 percent of the
population), Karen (7 percent), Arakanese (4 percent), and Mon (2 percent).
There are also significant numbers of Chin, Kachin, Kayah (Karenni), Pao,
Palaung, Lahu, Wa, and Rohingya. There are also sizable communities of
Chinese (3 percent of the population) and Indians (2 percent), most of
whom are found in the urban areas and along the main transport corridors.3
Despite the development of a few cities—Rangoon (with four million
people), Mandalay (800,000), and Moulmein (300,000)—about 70 percent
of Burma’s population still lives in small, rural towns and villages. Roughly
the same proportion is dependent on agriculture as the main means of liveli-
hood, a figure that has held surprisingly constant for the past century.4
Burma also enjoys an abundance of natural resources; it has been described
as potentially the richest country in Southeast Asia. Before the Second
World War, it was the largest rice producer in the world and a major ex-
porter of oil. Even now, about half the country remains covered by forest
and woodland, and its fishing grounds are relatively unexploited; in addi-
tion, Burma has 75 percent of the world’s known reserves of teak. The coun-
try had not recovered from the Second World War, however, before
management of its economy fell into the hands of the armed forces, which
adopted an ideology known as the “Burmese Way to Socialism.” Despite
some modest growth, this doctrinaire and highly centralized system was a
manifest failure, and in 1987 Burma was declared by the UN to be one of
the world’s least developed countries.5 Despite some improvement in the
economy since 1988, largely due to a more open system, state enterprises
remain highly inefficient, and privatisation efforts have stalled. There have
been attempts to widen the economic base, but the light-industrial sector is
still small. At three hundred U.S. dollars, Burma’s average annual per capita
income is lower than those of most other Asia-Pacific countries. Nearly 25
percent of the population is below the official World Bank poverty line.6
1. CIA, World Factbook 2000. See also Charles Hirschman, “Population and Society
in Twentieth-Century Southeast Asia,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Sep-
tember 1994, p. 390; and “Burma Says Population Passes 50 Million,” Reuters,
12 July 2000.
2. Nations with densities lower than Burma’s are Malaysia, Cambodia, Laos, and
Brunei.
3. CIA, World Factbook 2000. See also Peter Kunstadter, ed., Southeast Asian Tribes,
Minorities, and Nations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1967), vol. 1,
pp. 75–124; and Martin Smith, Ethnic Groups in Burma: Development, Democ-
racy and Human Rights (London: Anti-Slavery International, 1994), pp. 34–65.
4. Cheng Siok-hwa, The Rice Industry of Burma, 1852–1940 (Kuala Lumpur: Univ. of
Malaya Press, 1968), p. 220. See also CIA, World Factbook 2000.
5. For a concise summary of this period, see Khin Maung Kyi et al., Economic Devel-
opment of Burma: A Vision and a Strategy (Stockholm: Olof Palme International
Center, 2000), pp. 1–16.
6. CIA, World Factbook 2000. See also U.S. State Dept., Burma: Country Report on
Human Rights Practices—2000 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Democracy, Human
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the basis of what they believe to be the case as much as on the objective truth. For
example, not since the eighteenth century has China harbored expansionist am-
bitions toward or engaged in open hostilities with Burma, Thailand, or Laos;
China once included parts of these and other states in a list of “lost territories,”
but this list has been omitted from Chinese public statements since the 1967
Cultural Revolution. Yet regional perceptions of China’s long-term strategic in-
tentions are still coloured by the historical evidence of China’s support for com-
munist guerrilla movements during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, its war with
India in 1962, its (unsuccessful) invasion of Vietnam in 1979, and its more re-
cent occupation of reefs and islands in the South China Sea.24 China’s economic
growth and military development are being watched closely by analysts in the
region, and any signs that China is looking to extend its strategic reach are con-
sidered causes for concern.
In this regard, Burma’s close relationship with China since 1989, in particular
its defence links, has attracted considerable attention. Over the past fourteen
years there have been numerous reports in the international media and profes-
sional journals to the effect that China has provided the Rangoon regime with a
wide range of military equipment, arms production facilities, and training pro-
grams.25 There has also been a spate of news items that China and Burma have an
intelligence-sharing arrangement and that Chinese military personnel are help-
ing to operate some electronic surveillance equipment reportedly acquired by
the Burmese armed forces.26 Some commentators have gone farther and claimed
that China has already established a permanent military presence in Burma, one
that includes naval and air bases and specialized facilities to replenish Chinese
naval vessels (including submarines) during regular deployments to the Indian
Ocean.27 Burma has even been characterized as a “pawn” of China, or at least a
satellite state.
While some of these reports are true, either in whole or in part, the accuracy
of others is highly suspect. Few can be verified from independent sources, and a
number are clearly based on unsubstantiated rumours or idle speculation. Some
of the more outlandish stories may have been planted deliberately by self-interested
parties.28 Yet, accurate or not, these and similar reports have played on existing sus-
picions of China’s aims and helped fuel a more immediate concern that Burma’s re-
lationship with China could threaten regional stability. These perceptions have in
turn prompted a number of specific policy decisions by Southeast Asian govern-
ments. For example, aside from the strong economic motives that are clearly
present, the reluctance of these states to join in the West’s condemnation of the
Rangoon regime almost certainly stems in part from a fear of driving Burma far-
ther into the arms of China.29 In addition, among the reasons why Burma was
admitted to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1997 against
5 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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the wishes of the West was an apparent desire on the part of member states to
draw Rangoon away from Beijing’s orbit and prevent it from actually becoming
China’s stalking horse in the region.30
India, at first an outspoken critic of the State Law and Order Restoration
Council, soon reassessed the value of a hard line against Rangoon. Since 1989
New Delhi has watched anxiously as Chinese capital, aid, and military equip-
ment have flowed into Burma. Fears of China’s long-term intentions have been
heightened by news reports of Chinese naval bases being constructed on the
Burmese coast and of intelligence collection stations being developed in and
around the Andaman Sea.31 As one Indian analyst puts it,
While China professes a policy of peace and friendliness toward India, its deeds are
clearly aimed at the strategic encirclement of India in order to marginalise India in
Asia and tie it down to the Indian sub-continent. . . . Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal
and Sri Lanka have been assiduously and cleverly cultivated towards this end.
Myanmar [Burma] has been recently added to this list.32
All of these factors prompted a major policy switch in the early 1990s, as India
too became afraid of pushing Burma further into China’s embrace. New Delhi
began establishing closer bilateral relations with Rangoon through increased
political, trade, and even military ties.33 At the same time, India began trying to
develop its economic relations with such Southeast Asian countries as Thailand,
while representing itself to countries such as Singapore and Vietnam as a strate-
gic counterweight to China.34
Others in the Asia-Pacific region have also been feeling uneasy. Japan, for
example, is apparently concerned about China’s increasing influence in Burma
and its implications for regional stability, in light of China’s rivalry with India.
This may be one reason why the Japanese government has been keen to restore
aid to Burma, despite the opposition of the United States and other Western de-
mocracies.35 Japan is also reported to be worried about the security of its
sea-lanes through the Malacca Strait, which are essential for its Middle Eastern
oil imports. The possibility of increased Chinese naval deployments to the
Indian Ocean and the reported construction of Chinese naval and intelli-
gence facilities in the Mergui Archipelago have added a new factor for Japan’s
consideration.36
The Republic of Korea shares some of Japan’s concerns. It too is dependent on
oil shipments from the Middle East and hopes to develop its “textbook comple-
mentary” trade with Burma.37 While President Kim Dae Jung has been a consis-
tent supporter of the Burmese democratic movement, South Korea is keen to see
international friction avoided in that part of the world.
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In contrast, Burma’s foreign policies and their wider implications do not ap-
pear to have attracted a great deal of interest on the part of Western analysts and
officials.38 This may soon change. Should the Bush administration continue to
see its relationship with Beijing in terms of a “strategic competition” rather than
the “strategic partnership” once envisioned by President William J. Clinton,
Burma’s close relationship with China could assume much greater importance
as an integral part of a much larger security architecture. For example, the cur-
rently developing ties between the United States and India, including shared in-
terests in a ballistic missile shield, are being viewed by some regional observers
as part of a long-term move to offset China’s strong security relationships with
countries like Burma and Pakistan. Similarly, American military aid to Thai-
land, aimed in the first instance at stemming the flow of narcotics across the
Burmese border, has been interpreted as the beginning of a proxy struggle be-
tween the United States on the one hand and China on the other, through their
Thai and Burmese allies.39
For its part, China has much to gain from a close relationship with Burma.
The People’s Republic remains anxious about the security of its frontiers, in-
cluding its long border with Burma. The present government in Ran-
goon—friendly and politically compatible, looking to China for support against
the Western democracies—is very much to Beijing’s liking. In any case, the cur-
rent alternative to the military regime is opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi,
seen by Chinese leaders as strongly inclined to the United States; a democratic
government in Rangoon would thus add to China’s fears of strategic encircle-
ment by the United States and its allies.40 While regular Chinese naval deploy-
ments to the Indian Ocean are a distant prospect, some analysts believe that
access to Burmese ports could eventually permit the People’s Liberation Army
Navy to “control and dominate the Indian Ocean’s [sea lines of communica-
tion],” including the Straits of Malacca.41 Beijing is also keen to develop the
economy of southern China by exporting goods through a transport corridor
stretching from Yunnan to the Irrawaddy River at Bhamo and thence to the Bay
of Bengal.42 Burma is already exporting timber, agricultural and marine prod-
ucts, and precious stones to China, and it is receiving light industrial machinery
and consumer goods in return.43
At the diplomatic level, the ASEAN countries are probably correct in judging
that China sees Burma as a sympathetic voice in regional councils. In this regard,
Beijing would not have to dictate terms to Rangoon, as the Burmese regime al-
ready shares Beijing’s views on such key issues as internal security, human rights,
and whether other governments and multilateral organizations are entitled to
involve themselves in a country’s domestic affairs.44 In addition, China no doubt
welcomes the addition of Burma to that diverse coalition of countries around
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the world (including Russia, Iraq, Libya, India, and Malaysia) that are concerned
about the sole-superpower status and global economic influence of the United
States. These countries also distrust the increased willingness of the United Na-
tions since 1990 to intervene in global crises in response to humanitarian senti-
ment or to promote regional stability. China knows that its position on the
Security Council is seen by the Rangoon regime as the ultimate guarantee
against a UN-sponsored military operation to restore democracy in Burma or to
create autonomous ethnic states, as was done by the multilateral intervention in
East Timor.45 In return, China feels it can count on Burma’s support in other UN
debates on such subjects as human rights and arms sales.
THE FUTURE
There are two main schools of thought about future Burma-China relations.46
The first harks back to the great-power politics and strategic balances of the Cold
War era. Its advocates argue that small, poverty-stricken Burma will inevitably
succumb to the pressures of its much larger neighbor and effectively become a
pawn (if it is not already a pawn) in China’s bid to become a world power. The
members of this school cite, in addition to China’s enormous strategic weight, its
apparent “stranglehold”over Burma, represented by loans, arms sales, and trade.47
The second school argues that throughout history Burma has always been
highly suspicious of China, that it turned to Beijing in 1989 only out of dire
necessity, having been ostracized by the West. Proponents of this view claim that
China has not been as successful in winning Burma’s confidence as is sometimes
reported. They also believe that the Rangoon government would be prepared to
pay a very high price to remain independent, and they accept the regime’s
repeated assurances that Chinese military bases will never be permitted in
Burma.48 Should the Rangoon government wish to break out of China’s em-
brace, this second school argues, then India, other regional countries, and possi-
bly even the Western democracies would be prepared to assist.49
The latter school reflects the deeper understanding of Burmese history. The
conclusion that Burma has become a satellite of China and would be a willing ally
in any future military confrontation between China and other regional countries
should not go unchallenged. Indeed, it can be argued that in many respects it is
not Beijing but Rangoon that has the whip hand. The military regime recognizes
Burma’s considerable debts to China and its vulnerability to a range of Chinese
diplomatic, economic, and military pressures, but it believes it can manage the
bilateral relationship in a way that preserves Burma’s sovereignty, territorial integ-
rity, and freedom of action.50 The regime may have been encouraged by the way
that Chinese officials in Burma have kept a low public profile and have learned to
tread warily in contacts with their Burmese counterparts. They seem to have
S E L T H 5 5
14
Naval War College Review, Vol. 55 [2002], No. 2, Art. 4
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss2/4
behaved in this way so as not to offend the notoriously volatile and unpredictable
Burmese leadership and thereby lose the gains China has made since 1988. The
Chinese may also retain memories of the violent anti-Chinese riots in Rangoon
of 1967, unrest that led to a break in diplomatic relations.
In any case, the State Law and Order Restoration Council and its nominal
successor, the (again, all-military) State Peace and Development Council, have
been quick to perceive Burma’s growing importance in the increasingly fluid
Asia-Pacific strategic environment. Over its fourteen-year history the military
government has become adept at exploiting Burma’s geostrategic position and
at manipulating the concerns of its regional neighbors. For example, it has been
quite comfortable about using its close relationship with Beijing and the possi-
bility of its becoming an ally of an expansionist China to gain attention in im-
portant councils like ASEAN and to attract support from influential rivals like
India and Singapore.51
In addition, there are other security issues that are likely to focus interna-
tional attention on Burma over the next decade. For example, since 1988 the
Rangoon regime has implemented a massive military expansion and moderni-
sation program. The Burmese armed forces (known as the Tatmadaw) have
more than doubled in size and are now the second largest in Southeast Asia.
Should Vietnam continue to reduce its military, Burma’s could become the
largest. Thanks largely to China, its armed forces are already among the best
armed. Since 1988 the Burmese air force has acquired nearly two hundred new
combat aircraft, the navy has commissioned more than thirty surface combat-
ants, and the army has been reequipped with a wide range of armoured vehicles,
artillery, surface-to-air missiles, and infantry weapons. The Tatmadaw still has a
number of serious problems to overcome, but has been transformed from a
small, weak counterinsurgency force barely able to maintain internal security
into a very large, much more powerful defense force, increasingly capable of
major conventional operations.52 While the Burmese armed forces still lack a
credible power-projection capability, regional countries like Thailand and India
have already expressed concern about Burma’s rapidly growing strength and
cited it as justification for military acquisition programs of their own.
There are a number of other disturbing trends. Thailand and Bangladesh, for
example, continue to express concern about the wider implications of Burma’s
persistent internal problems, particularly the periodic outflows of refugees
across its borders that these “internal problems” often produce.53 Burma has also
attracted strong criticism over its failure to stem the flow of narcotics from the
“Golden Triangle”* and to take action to counter its rapidly growing HIV/AIDS
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problem. These issues are seen, and not only by Burma’s neighbors, as having
far-reaching strategic implications.54 For example, in 2000 the American secre-
tary of state characterized HIV/AIDS as Southeast Asia’s greatest threat to health
and security.55 In addition, international attention has been drawn to Burma’s
use of forced labor and child soldiers, its indiscriminate sowing of land mines,
its intolerance of religious minorities, and its traffic in small arms. The Rangoon
regime has been slow to react to international representations about such issues;
a rare exception occurred in 1992, when the State Law and Order Restoration
Council responded to protests by the Islamic countries of ASEAN and permitted
the repatriation of some Muslim Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh. The plight
of the Rohingyas had attracted the attention also of Islamic extremists from
Afghanistan and the Middle East—as well as that of the UN secretary-general,
who declared that he was “seriously concerned” that the crisis could threaten the
stability of Southeast Asia.56
In such a climate of uncertainty, interstate tension, and incipient instability,
Burma’s geostrategic position is likely to become more important to regional se-
curity than it was in past decades. Burma may also become a player in the wider
strategic environment, especially if the current relationship between the United
States and China develops into a more overt competition, into which other
Asia-Pacific states are drawn, for political and economic influence. In these cir-
cumstances, Burma would probably attempt to steer an independent course,
while protecting its relationship with China as far as possible. The U.S. govern-
ment would come under domestic pressure to maintain a hard line against Ran-
goon, but the realpolitik of great-power rivalry could oblige it to change its
policy toward Burma and to seek a more neutral, if not closer, relationship.
Should that occur, other Western democracies would find it hard not to follow
the American lead.
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